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I1 
PREJUDICES RELATING TO ART 
can be no doubt that the process of distinction THERE of art  from the facts and the acts with which it has 
been and is confused, which I have summarily traced, neces- 
sitates no small mental effort ; but this effort is rewarded with 
the freedom which it affords of handling the many fallacious 
distinctions which disfigure the field of Esthetic. These, al- 
though they do not present any difficulty in thinking out (in- 
deed, at first they seduce by their very facility and deceitful 
self-evidence), yet imply the other and greater annoyance of 
preventing all profound understanding, and indeed of mak- 
ing it impossible to understand anything as to what art  truly 
is. I t  is true that many people, in order to retain the power 
of repeating vulgar and traditional distinctions, voluntarily 
resign themselves to this ignorance. We ,  on the contrary, 
now prefer to throw them all away, as a useless hindrance in 
the new task to which the new theoretic position that we 
have attained invites and leads us, and to enjoy the greater 
facility which comes from feeling rich. Wealth is not only 
to be obtained by acquiring many objects, but, on the con- 
trary, by getting rid of all those that represent economic 
debt.  
Let us begin with the most famous of these economic 
debts in the circle of mthetic: the distinction between con- 
tent and form, which has caused a division of schools even 
in the nineteenth century: the schools of the zsthetic of 
the content (Gehaltsasthetik) and that of the zsthetic of 
form (Formlesthetik) . T h e  problems from which these 
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opposed schools arose were, in general, the following : Does 
ar t  consist solely of the content, o r  solely of the form, or  of 
content and form together? Wha t  is the character of the 
content, what that of the aesthetic form?-It was an- 
swered, on the one hand, that art,  the essence of art, is all 
contained in the content, defined as that which pleases, o r  as 
what is moral, or as what raises man to the heaven of re- 
ligion or  of metaphysic, o r  as what is historically correct, or, 
finally, as what is naturally and physically beautiful. And, 
on the other hand, that the content is indifferent, that it is 
simply a peg or hook from which beautiful forms are 
suspended, which alone beatify the aesthetic spirit : unity, har- 
mony, symmetry, and so on. And on both sides it was 
attempted to attract the element that had previously been 
excluded from the essence of art  as subordinate and second- 
ary: those for the content admitted that it was an advantage 
to  the content (which, according to  them, was really the con- 
stitutive element of the beautiful) to adorn itself with beau- 
tiful forms also, and to present itself as unity, symmetry, har- 
mony, etc.; and the formalists, in their turn, admitted that 
if art  did not gain by the value of its content, its effect did, 
not a single value, but the sum of two values being in this 
case offered. These doctrines, which attained their greatest 
scholastic bulk in Germany with the Hegelians and the 
Herbartians, is also to  be found more or  less everywhere in 
the history of asthetic, ancient, mediaval, modern, and most 
modern; and is what amounts to most in common opinion, 
for  nothing is more common than to hear that a drama is 
beautiful in “form,” but a failure in “content)’; that a poem 
is “most nobly” conceived, but “executed in ugly verse”; that 
a painter would have been greater did he not waste his 
power as a designer and as a colourist, upon “small and un- 
worthy themes,” instead of selecting, on the contrary, those 
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of a historical, patriotic, o r  sociological character. I t  may 
be said that fine taste and true critical sense of ar t  have to 
defend themselves a t  every step against the perversions of 
judgment arising from these doctrines, in which philosophers 
become the crowd, and the crowd feels itself philosoph- 
ical, because in agreement with those crowd-philosophers. 
T h e  origin of these theories is no secret for  us, because, even 
in the brief sketch that we have given, it is quite clear that 
they have sprung from the trunk of hedonistic, moralistic, 
conceptualistic, o r  physical conceptions of a r t :  they are all 
doctrines which, failing to perceive what makes ar t  art,  
were obliged somehow to regain art, which they had allowed 
to escape them, and to reintroduce it in the form of an acces- 
sory or  accidental element; the upholders of the theory of the 
content conceived it as an abstract formal element, the for- 
malists as the abstract element of the content. Wha t  inter- 
ests us in those esthetics is just this dialectic, in which the 
theorists of the content become formalists against their will, 
and the formalists upholders of the theory of the content; 
thus each passes over to occupy the other’s place, but 
to be restless there and to return to  their own, which gives 
rise to the same restlessness. T h e  ‘‘beautiful forms” of Her- 
bart do not differ in any way from the “beautiful contents” 
of the Hegelians, because both are nothing. And we become 
yet more interested to  observe their efforts to get out of 
prison, and the blows with which they weaken its doors o r  its 
walls, and the air-holes which some of those thinkers suc- 
ceed in opening.-Their efforts are clumsy and sterile, like 
those of the theorists of the content (they are  to be seen 
in a repulsive form in the Philosophie des Schonen of 
Hartmann),  who, by adding stitch to stitch, composed 
a net of “beautiful contents” (beautiful, sublime, comic, 
tragic, humouristic, pathetic, idyllic, sentimental, etc., etc.) , 
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in which very coarse net they tried to enclose every form of 
reality, even that which they had called “ugly.” They 
failed to  perceive that their zsthetic content, thus made to 
enclose little by little the whole of reality, has no longer any 
character that distinguishes it from other contents, since 
there is no content beyond reality; and that therefore their 
fundamental theory was thus fundamentally negated. These 
contradictory and ingenuous explosions resemble those of 
other formalistic theorists of the content who maintained the 
concept of an aesthetic content, but defined it as that “which 
interests man,” and made the interest relating to  man to  lie 
in his different historical situations-that is, relative to the 
individual. This was another way of denying the initial 
assumption, for it is very clear that the artist would not 
produce art, did he not interest himself in something which 
is the datum or  the problem of his production, but that this 
something becomes art  only because the artist, by becoming 
interested in it, makes it so.-These are evasions of formal- 
ists, who after having limited ar t  to abstract beautiful forms, 
void of all content and only to be summed up with contents, 
timidly introduced among beautiful forms that of the har- 
mony of content with form; or more resolutely declared 
themselves partisans of a sort of eclecticism, which makes art  
to consist of a sort of “relation” of the beautiful content with 
the beautiful form, and, with an incorrectness worthy of 
eclectics, attributed to  terms outside the relation qualities 
which they assume only within the relation. 
For the truth is really this: content and form must be 
clearly distinguished in art, but must not be separately quali- 
fied as artistic, precisely because their relation only is artistic 
-that is, their unity, understood not as an abstract, dead 
unity, but as concrete and living, which is that of the synthesis 
a priori; and art  is a true es the t ic  synthesis a priori of feeling 
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and image in the intuition, as to which it may be repeated 
that feeling without image is blind, and image without 
feeling is void. Feeling and image do not exist for the 
artistic spirit outside the synthesis ; they will have existence 
from another point of view in another plane of knowledge, 
and feeling will be the practical aspect of the spirit that 
loves and hates, desires and dislikes, and the image will be 
the inanimate residue of art, the withered leaf, prey of the 
wind of imagination and of amusement’s caprice. All 
this has no concern with the artist or the aesthetician : 
just as art  is no vain fancying, so is it not tumultuous pas- 
sionality, but the uplifting of that act by means of another 
act, or, i f  it be preferred, the substitution of that tumult for 
another tumult, that of the longing to  create and to  contem- 
plate for the joys and the sorrows of artistic creation. I t  
is therefore indifferent, or a question of terminological op- 
portunity, whether we should present ar t  as content or as 
form, provided it be always recognised that the content is 
formed and the form filled, that feeling is figurative feeling 
and the figure a figure that is felt. And it is only owing to  
historical deference toward him who better than others 
caused the concept of the autonomy of art  to be appreciated, 
and wished to affirm this autonomy with the word “form,” 
thus opposing alike the abstract theory of the content of the 
philosophisers and moralists and the abstract formalism of 
the academicians,-in deference, I say, to D e  Sanctis, and 
also because of the ever active polemic against the attempts 
to  absorb ar t  in other modes of spiritual activity,-that the 
aesthetic of the intuition can be called “Esthet ic  of form.” I t  
is useless to refute an objection that certainly might be made 
(but rather with the sophistry of the advocate than with the 
acuteness of the scientist), namely, that the aesthetic of the 
intuition also, since it describes the content of art  as feeling 
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or  state of the soul, qualifies it outside the intuition, and 
seems to admit that a content, which is not feeling o r  a state 
of the soul, does not lend itself to artistic elaboration, and 
is not an esthetic content. Feeling, o r  the state of the soul, 
is not a particular content, but the whole universe seen sub 
specie intuitionis; and outside it there is no other content 
conceivable that is not also a different form of the intuitive 
form ; not thoughts, which are the whole universe sub specie 
cogitationis; not physical things and mathematical beings, 
which are the whole universe sub specie schematismi et 
abstractionis; not wills, which are the whole universe sub 
specie volitionis. 
Another not less fallacious distinction ( to  which the 
words “content” and “form” are also applied) separates in- 
tuition from expression, the image from the physical transla- 
tion of the image. I t  places on one side phantasms of feeling, 
images of men, of animals, of landscapes, of actions, of ad- 
ventures, and so on ;  and on the other, sounds, tones, lines, 
colours, and so on;  calling the first the external, the second 
the internal element of ar t :  the art properly so-called, the 
other technique. I t  is easy to distinguish internal and exter- 
nal, a t  least in words, especially when no minute enquiry is 
made as to the reasons and motives for the distinction, and 
when the distinction is just thrown down there without any 
service being demanded of i t ;  so easy that by never think- 
ing about it the distinction may eventually come to seem to 
thought indubitable. But it becomes a different question 
when, as must be done with every distinction, we pass from 
the act of distinguishing to that of establishing relation and 
unifying, because this time we run against desperate obstacles. 
Wha t  has here been distinguished cannot be unified, because 
it has been badly distinguished: how can something external 
and extraneous to the internal become united to the internal 
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and express i t? H o w  can a sound o r  a colour express an im- 
age without sound and without colour? H o w  can the bodi- 
less express a body? H o w  can the spontaneity of fancy and 
of reflection and even technical action coincide in the same 
act? When the intuition has been distinguished from the 
expression, and the one has been made different from the 
other, no ingenuity of terms can reunite them; all the proc- 
esses of association, of habit, of mechanicising, of forget- 
ting, of  instinctification, proposed by the psychologists and 
laboriously developed by them, allow the scissure to re- 
appear a t  the end: on one side the expression, on the other 
the image. And there does not seem to be any way of 
escape, save that of taking refuge in the hypothesis of a 
mystery which, according to poetical o r  mathematical tastes, 
will assume the appearance of a mysterious marriage or  of 
a mysterious psychophysical parallelism. T h e  first is a par- 
allelism incorrectly overcome ; the second, a marriage de- 
ferred to distant ages o r  to the obscurity of the unknowable. 
But before having recourse to mystery ( a  refuge to which 
there is always time to fly), we must enquire whether the 
two elements have been correctly distinguished, and i f  an 
intuition without expression be conceivable. I t  may happen 
that the thing is as little existing and as inconceivable as a 
soul without a body, which has truly been as much talked 
of in philosophies as in religions, but to have talked about 
it is not the same thing as to have experienced and con- 
ceived it. In reality, we know nothing but expressed in- 
tuitions : a thought is not thought for us, unless it be possible 
to formulate it in words; a musical fancy, only when it 
becomes concrete in sounds; a pictorial image, only when it 
is coloured. W e  do not say that the words must necessarily 
be declaimed in a loud voice, the music performed, or  the 
picture painted upon wood o r  canvas; but it is certain that 
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when a thought is really thought, when it has attained to the 
maturity of thought, the words run through our whole or- 
ganism, soliciting the muscles of our mouth and ringing 
internally in our ears; when music is truly music, it trills in 
the throat and shivers in the fingers that touch ideal notes; 
when a pictorial image is pictorially real, we are impreg 
nated with lymphs that are colours, and maybe, where the 
colouring matters were not at  our disposition, we might spon- 
taneously colour surrounding objects by a sort of irradia- 
tion, as is said of certain hysterics and of certain saints, who 
caused the stigmata upon their hands and feet by means of an 
act of imagination ! Thought, musical fancy, pictorial image, 
did not indeed exist without expression, they did not exist at  
all previous to the formation of  this expressive state of the 
spirit. To  believe in their pre-existence is ingenuousness, 
i f  it be ingenuous to have faith in those impotent poets, paint- 
ers, o r  musicians who always have their heads full of poetic, 
pictorial, and musical creations, and only fail to translate 
them into external form, either because, as they say, they are 
impatient of expression, or  because technique is not suffi- 
ciently advanced to afford sufficient means for their expres- 
sion: many centuries ago it offered sufficient means to 
Homer,  Pheidias, and Apelles, but it does not suffice for  
them, who, if we are to believe them, carry in their mighty 
heads an ar t  greater than those others 2 Sometimes, too, in- 
genuousness arises from the illusion due to keeping a bad 
account with ourselves that, having imagined, and conse- 
quently expressed, some few images, we already possess 
in ourselves all the other images that must form part of  a 
work, which we do not yet possess, as well as the vital nexus 
that should connect them, which is not yet formed and there- 
fore is not expressed. 
Art, understood as intuition, according to the concept that 
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I have exposed, having denied the existence of a physical 
world outside of it, which it looks upon as simply a con- 
struction of our intellect, does not know what to  do with the 
parallelism of the thinking substance and of substance ex- 
tended in space, and has no need to promote impossible mar- 
riages, because its thinking substance-or, better, its intuitive 
act-is perfect in itself, and is that same fact which the in- 
tellect afterwards constructs as extended. And inasmuch as 
an image without expression is inconceivable, by just so much 
is an image which shall be also expression conceivable, and 
indeed logically necessary; that is, which shall be really an 
image. If we take from a poem its metre, its rhythm, and 
its words, poetical thought does not, as some opine, remain 
behind: there remains nothing. T h e  poetry is born, like 
those words, that rhythm, and that metre. Nor could ex- 
pression be compared with the epidermis of organisms, un- 
less it be said (and perhaps this may not be false even in 
physiology) that all the organism in every cell’s cell is also 
epidermis. 
I should, however, be wanting to  my methodological con- 
victions and to  my intention of doing justice to  errors (and 
I have already done justice to  the distinction of form and 
content by demonstrating the truth at which they aimed and 
failed to grasp),  were I not to indicate what truth may also 
be active at  the base of the false distinction of the indistin- 
guishable, intuition and expression. Fancy and technique are 
rationally distinguished, though not as elements of a r t ;  and 
they are related and united between themselves, though pot 
in the field of art, but in the wider field of the spirit in its 
totality. Technical o r  practical problems to be solved, diffi- 
culties to be vanquished, are truly present to the artist, and 
there is truly something which, without being really physical, 
and being, like everything real, a spiritual act, can be meta- 
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phoricised as physical in respect to the intuition. What  is 
this something? T h e  artist, whom we have left vibrating 
with expressed images which break forth by infinite channels 
from his whole being, is a whole man, and therefore also a 
practical man, and as such takes measures against losing the 
result of  his spiritual labour, and in favour of rendering 
possible o r  easy, for himself and for others, the reproduc- 
tion of his images ; hence he engages in practical acts which 
assist that work of reproduction. These practical acts are 
guided, as are all practical acts, by knowledge, and for  this 
reason are called technical; and, since they are practical, they 
are distinguished from contemplation, which is theoretical, 
and seem to be external to it, and are therefore called phys- 
ical: and they assume this name the more easily in so fa r  
as they are fixed and made abstract by the intellect. Thus 
writing and phonography are united with words and music, 
canvas and wood and walls covered with colours, stone cut 
and incised, iron and bronze and other metals melted and 
moulded to certain shapes by sculpture and architecture. 
So distinct among themselves are the two forms of activ- 
ity that it is possible to be a great artist with a bad tech- 
nique, a poet who corrects the proofs of his verses badly, an 
architect who makes use of unsuitable material o r  does not 
attend to statics, a painter who uses colours that deteriorate 
rapidly: examples of these weaknesses are so frequent that 
it is not worth while to cite any of them. But what is im- 
possible is to be a great poet who writes verses badly, a great 
painter who does not give tone to his colours, a great archi- 
tect who does not harmonise his lines, a great composer who 
does not harmonise his notes; and, in short, a great artist 
who cannot express himself. I t  has been said of Raphael 
that he would have been a great painter even if he had not 
possessed hands ; but certainly not that he would have been 
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a great painter if the sense of design and colour had been 
wanting to him. 
And (be it noted in passing, for I must condense as I pro- 
ceed) this apparent transformation of the intuitions into 
physical things-altogether analogous with the apparent 
transformation of wants and economic labour into things 
and into merchandise-also explains how people have come 
to talk not only of “artistic things” and of “beautiful things,” 
but also of ‘‘a beautiful of nature.” I t  is evident that, be- 
sides the instruments that are made for the reproduction of 
images, objects already existing can be met with, whether 
produced by man o r  not, which perform such a service- 
that is to say, are more o r  less adapted to fixing the memory 
of our intuitions; and these things take the name of “natural 
beauties,” and exercise their fascination only when we know 
how to understand them with the same soul with which the 
artist o r  artists have taken and appropriated them, giving 
value to them and indicating the “point of view” from 
which we must look at them, thus connecting them with their 
own intuitions. But the always imperfect adaptability, the 
fugitive nature, the mutability of “natural beauties” also 
justify the inferior place accorded to them, compared with 
beauties produced by art. Let us leave it to rhetoricians o r  
madmen to affirm that a beautiful tree, a beautiful river, a 
sublime mountain, o r  even a beautiful horse o r  a beautiful 
human figure, are superior to the chisel-stroke of Michel- 
angelo o r  the verse of Dante;  but let us say, with greater 
propriety, that “Nature” is stupid compared with Art,  and 
that she is “mute,” if man does not make her speak. 
A third distinction, which also labours to distinguish the 
indistinguishable, is attached to the concept of the Esthetic 
expression, and divides it into two moments of expres- 
sion abstractly considered, propriety and beauty of expres- 
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sion, or  adorned expression, founding upon these the classi- 
fication of two orders of expression, naked and ornate. 
This is a doctrine of which traces may be found in all the 
various domains of art, but which has not been developed in 
any one of them to the same extent as in that of words, 
where it bears a celebrated name and is called “Rhetoric,” 
and has had a very long history, from the Greek rhetoricians 
to our own day. I t  persists in the schools, in treatises, 
and even in aesthetics of scientific pretensions, not to mention 
in common belief (as  is natural), though in our day it has 
lost much of its primitive vigour. Men of lofty intellect 
have accepted it, o r  let it live, for centuries, owing to  the 
force of inertia o r  of tradition; the few rebels have hardly 
ever attempted to reduce their rebellion to a system and 
to cut out the error at  its roots. T h e  injury done by 
Rhetoric, with its idea of “ornate” as differing from, and 
of greater value than, “naked” speech, has not been limited 
solely to the circle of Esthetic, but has appeared also in criti- 
cism, and even in literary education, because, just as it was 
incapable of explaining perfect beauty, so it was adapted to  
provide an apparent justification for  vitiated beauty, and to 
encourage writing in an inflated, affected, and improper 
form. However, the division which it introduces and on 
which it relies is a logical contradiction, because, as is easy 
to prove, it destroys the concept itself, which it undertakes 
to divide into moments, and the objects, which it undertakes 
to divide into classes. An appropriate expression, if appro- 
priate, is also beautiful, beauty being nothing but the deter- 
mination of the image, and therefore of the expression; and 
if it be wished to indicate by calling it naked that there is 
something wanting which should be present, then the expres- 
sion is inappropriate and deficient, either it is not or  is not 
yet expression. On the other hand, an ornate expression, i f  it 
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be expressive in every part, cannot be called ornate, but as 
naked as the other, and as appropriate as the other; i f  it 
contain inexpressive, additional, extrinsic elements, it is not 
beautiful, but ugly, it is not o r  is not yet expression; to be so, 
it must purify itself of external elements ( a s  the other must 
be enriched with the elements that are wanting). 
Expression and beauty are  not two concepts, but a single 
concept, which it is permissible to designate with either 
synonymous vocable : artistic fancy is always corporeal, but 
it is not obese, being always clad with itself and never 
charged with anything else, o r  “ornate.” Certainly a prob- 
lem was lurking beneath this falsest of distinctions, the neces- 
sity of making a distinction; and the problem (as  can be 
deduced from certain passages in Aristotle, and from the 
psychology and gnoseology of the Stoics, and as we see it, 
intensified in the discussions of the Italian rhetoricians of the 
seventeenth century) was concerned with the relations be- 
tween thought and fancy, philosophy and poetry, logic and 
asthetic (dialectic and rhetoric, or, as was still said at  the 
time, the “open” and the closed “fist”). “Naked” expres- 
sion referred to thought and to  philosophy, (‘ornate” ex- 
pression to fancy and to poetry. But it is not less true that 
this problem as to the distinction between the two forms of 
the theoretical spirit could not be solved in the field of one of 
them, intuition o r  expression, where nothing will ever be 
found but fancy, poetry, asthetic; and the undue introduc- 
tion of logic will only project there a deceitful shadow, which 
will darken and hamper intelligence, depriving it of the view 
of ar t  in its fulness and purity, without giving it that of lo- 
gicity and of thought. 
But the greatest injury caused by the rhetorical doctrine 
of “ornate” expression to the theoretical systematisation of 
the forms of the human spirit, concerns the treatment of lan- 
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guage, because, granted that we admit naked and simply 
grammatical expressions, and expressions that are ornate o r  
rhetorical, language becomes an aggregate of naked expres- 
sions and is handed over to grammar, and, as an ulterior 
consequence (since grammar finds no place in rhetoric and 
asthetic), to logic, where the subordinate office of a 
semeiotic o r  ars significandi is assigned to it. Indeed, the 
logistic conception of language is closely united and proceeds 
pari passu with the rhetorical doctrine of expression; they 
appeared together in Hellenic antiquity, and they still exist, 
though disputed, in our time. Rebellions against the logi- 
cism of the doctrine of language have rarely appeared, and 
have had as little efficacy as those against rhetoric; and only 
in the romantic period (traversed by Vico a century before) 
has a lively consciousness been formed by certain thinkers 
as to the fantastic o r  metaphoric nature of language, and its 
closer connection with poetry than with logic. Yet since a 
more o r  less inartistic idea of ar t  persisted even among the 
best (conceptualism, moralism, hedonism, etc.) , there re- 
mained a very powerful impediment to the identification of 
language and art .  This identification appears to be as un- 
avoidable as it is easy, having established the concept of 
art  as intuition and of intuition as expression, and there- 
fore implicitly its identity with language : always assuming 
that language be conceived in its full extension, without ar- 
bitrary restrictions to so-called articulate language and 
without arbitrary exclusion of tonic, mimetic, and graphic; 
and in all its intension-that is, taken in its reality, which is 
the act of speaking itself, without falsifying it with the 
abstractions of grammars and vocabularies, and with the 
foolish belief that man speaks with the vocabulary and with 
grammar. Man speaks at every instant like the poet, be- 
cause, like the poet, he expresses his impressions and his 
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feelings in the form called conversational o r  familiar, which 
is not separated by any abyss from the other forms called 
prosaic, poetic-prosaic, narrative, epic, dialogue, dramatic, 
lyric, melic, song, and so on. And if it do not displease man 
in general to be considered poet and always poet ( a s  he is by 
force of his humanity), it should not displease the poet to 
be united with common humanity, because this union alone 
explains the power which poetry, understood in the loftiest 
and in the narrowest sense, wields over all human souls. 
Were poetry a language apart, a “language of the gods,” 
men would not understand i t ;  and if it elevate them, it ele- 
vates them not above, but within themselves : true democracy 
and true aristocracy coincide in this field also. Coincidence 
of art  and language, which implies, as is natural, coincidence 
of aesthetic and of philosophy of language, definable the one 
by the other and therefore identical,-this I ventured to 
place twelve years ago in the title of a treatise of mine on 
Rsthetic, which has truly not failed of its effect upon many 
linguists and philosophers of Bsthetic in Italy and outside 
Italy, as is shewn by the copious “literature” which it has 
produced. This identification will benefit studies on ar t  and 
poetry by purifying them of hedonistic, moralistic, and con- 
ceptualistic residues, still to be found in such quantity in lit- 
erary and artistic criticism. But the benefit which it will con- 
fer upon linguistic studies will be f a r  more inestimable, for it 
is urgent that they should be disencumbered of physiological, 
psychological, and psychophysiological methods, now the 
fashion, and be freed from the ever returning theory of the 
conventional origin of language, which has the inevitable 
correlative of the mystical theory as its inevitable reaction. 
It will no longer be necessary to construct absurd parallel- 
isms even for  language, o r  to promote mysterious nuptials 
between sign and image: when language is no longer con- 
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ceived as a sign, but as an image which is significant-that is, 
a sign in itself, and therefore coloured, sounding, singing, 
articulate. T h e  significant image is the spontaneous work 
of the human spirit, whereas the sign, wherewith man agrees 
with man, presupposes language; or if it be wished, never- 
theless, t o  explain language by signs, it recommends us to 
call upon God, as upon the giver of the first signs-that is, to 
presuppose language in another way, by consigning it to the 
Unknowable. 
I shall conclude my account of the prejudices relating 
to ar t  with that one of them which is most usual, because it 
is mingled with the daily life of criticism, namely, history of 
art  : prejudice of the possibility of distinguishng several 
o r  many particular forms of art, each one determinable 
in its own particular concept and within its limits, and fur- 
nished with its proper laws. This erroneous doctrine is em- 
bodied in two systematic series, one of which is known as 
the theory of literary and artistic kinds (lyric, drama, ro- 
mance, epic and romantic poem, idyll, comedy, tragedy; 
sacred, civil-life, familiar, from life, still-life, landscape, 
flower and fruit painting; heroic, funereal, costume, sculp- 
ture ; church, operatic, chamber music ; civil, military, eccle- 
siastic architecture, etc., etc.), and the other as theory of 
the arts (poetry, painting, sculpture, architecture, music, 
ar t  of the actor, gardening, etc., etc.). One of these some- 
times figures as a subdivision of another. This prejudice, 
of which it is easy to trace the origin, has its first notable 
monuments in Hellenic culture, and persists in our days. 
Many astheticians still write treatises on the esthetic of the 
tragic, the comic, the lyric, the humorous, and esthetics of 
painting, of music, or  of poetry (these last are still called 
by the old name of “poetics”) ; and, what is worse (though 
but little attention is paid to these estheticians who are im- 
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pelled to write through solitary dilettantism or academic 
profession), critics, in judging works of art ,  have not alto- 
gether abandoned the habit of judging them according to 
the genus or  particular form of art to which, according to  
the above astheticians, they should belong; and, instead 
of clearly stating whether a work be beautiful o r  ugly, they 
proceed to reason their impressions, saying that it well 
observes, o r  wrongly violates, the laws of the drama, or  of 
romance, or  of painting, or  of bas-relief. I t  is also very 
common in all countries to  treat artistic and literary his- 
tory as history of kinds,  and to present the artists as culti- 
vating this or  that kind; and to  divide the work of an artist, 
which always has unity of development, whatever form it 
take, whether lyric, romance or  drama, into as many com- 
partments as there are kinds ; so that Lodovico Ariosto, for 
example, appears now among the cultivators of the Latin 
poetry of the Renaissance, now among the authors of the 
first Latin satires, now among those of the first comedies, 
now among those who brought the poem of chivalry to per- 
fection: as though Latin poetry, satire, comedy, and poem 
were not always the same poet, Ariosto, in his experiments, 
in his logic, and in the manifestations of his spiritual devel- 
opment. 
I t  is not to be denied that the theory of kinds and of the 
arts has not had, and does not now possess, its own internal 
dialectic and its autocriticism, or  irony, according as we may 
please to call i t ;  and no one is ignorant that literary history 
is full of these cases of an established style, against which an 
artist of genius offends in his work and calls forth the repro- 
bation of the critics : a reprobation which does not, however, 
succeed in suffocating the admiration for, and the popularity 
of, his work, so that finally, when it is not possible to  blame 
the artist and it is not wished to blame the critic of kinds, the 
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matter ends with a compromise, and the kind is enlarged 
o r  accepts beside it a new kind, like a legitimated bastard, 
and the compromise lasts, by force of inertia, until a new 
work of genius comes to  upset again the fixed rule. An 
irony of the doctrine is also the impossibility, in which the 
theoreticians find themselves, of logically fixing the boun- 
daries between the kinds and the arts : all the definitions that 
they have produced, when examined rather more closely, 
either evaporate in the general definition of art, or shew 
themselves to be an arbitrary raising to the rank of kinds 
and rules particular works of art  irreducible to  rigorous 
logical terms. Absurdities resulting from the effort to  de- 
termine rigorously what is indeterminable, owing to the 
contradictory nature of the attempt, are to  be found even 
among the great ones, even in Lessing, who arrives a t  this 
extravagant conclusion, that painting represents “bodies” : 
bodies, not actions and souls, not the action and the soul of 
the painter I They are also to be found among the questions 
that logically arise from that illogic: thus, a definite field 
having been assigned to every kind and to every art, what 
kind and what ar t  is superior? Is painting superior to sculp- 
ture, drama to  lyric? And again, the forces of art  having 
been thus divided, would it not be advisable to reunite them 
in a type of work of art  which shall drive away other forces, 
as a coalition of armies drives away a single army: will not 
the work, for  instance, in which poetry, music, scenic art, dec- 
oration, are united, develop a greater Esthetic force than a 
Lied of Goethe or  a drawing of Leonardo? These are ques- 
tions, distinctions, judgments, and definitions which arouse 
the revolt of the poetic and artistic sense, which loves each 
work for itself, for what it is, as a living creature, individual 
and incomparable, and knows that each work has its individ- 
ual law. Hence has arisen the disagreement between the 
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affirmative judgment of artistic souls and the negative one 
of professional critics, between the negation of the former 
and the affirmation of the latter ; and the professional critics 
pass for pedants, not without good reason, although artistic 
souls are in their turn “disarmed prophets”-that is, inca- 
pable of reasoning and of deducing the correct theory im- 
manent in their judgments, and of opposing it to the 
pedantic theory of their adversaries. 
Tha t  correct theory is precisely an aspect of the concep- 
tion of ar t  as intuition, o r  lyrical intuition; and, since every 
work of ar t  expresses a state of the soul, and the state of the 
soul is individual and always new, the intuition implies in- 
finite intuitions, which it is impossible to  place in pigeonholes 
as kinds, unless these be infinite pigeonholes, and therefore 
not pigeonholes of kinds, but of intuitions. And since, on 
the other hand, individuality of intuition implies individu- 
ality of expression, and a picture is distinct from another 
picture, not less than from a poem, and picture and poem 
are not of value because of the sounds that beat the air 
and the colours refracted by the light, but because of what 
they can tell to  the spirit, in so fa r  as they enter into it, it is 
useless to have recourse to abstract means of expression, to  
construct the other series of kinds and classes: which 
amounts to saying that any theory of  the division of the arts 
is without foundation. T h e  kind o r  class is in this case one 
only, ar t  itself o r  the intuition, whereas single works of ar t  
are infinite: all are original, each one incapable of being 
translated into the other (since to  translate, to  translate with 
artistic skill, is to create a new work of a r t ) ,  each one uncon- 
trolled by the intellect. N o  intermediate element interposes 
itself philosophically between the universal and the particu- 
lar, no series of kinds o r  species, of generalia. Neither the 
artist who produces art, nor the spectator who contemplates 
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it, has need of anything but the universal and the individual, 
or,  better, the universal individuated : the universal artistic 
activity, which is all contracted or  concentrated in the repre- 
sentation of a single state of the soul. 
Nevertheless, i f  the pure artist and the pure critic, and 
also the pure philosopher, are not occupied with generalia, 
with classes o r  kinds, these retain their utility on other 
grounds; and this utility is the true side of those erroneous 
theories, which I will not leave without mention. I t  is cer- 
tainly useful to construct a net of generalia, not for the pro- 
duction of art, which is spontaneous, nor for the judgment of 
it, which is philosophical, but to collect and to some extent 
circumscribe the infinite single intuitions, for the use of the 
attention and of memory, in order to group together to some 
extent the innumerable particular works of art. These classes 
will always be formed, as is natural, either by means of the 
abstract imagination o r  the abstract expression, and therefore 
as classes of states of the soul (literary and artistic kinds) 
and classes of means of expression ( a r t ) .  N o r  does it avail 
to object here that the various kinds and arts are arbitrarily 
distinguished, and that the general dichotomy is itself ar- 
bitrary; since it is admitted without difficulty that the proce- 
dure is certainly arbitrary, but the arbitrariness becomes 
innocuous and useful from the very fact that every preten- 
sion of being a philosophical principle and criterion for the 
judgment of art  is removed from it. Those kinds and classes 
render easy the knowledge of ar t  and education in art, offer- 
ing to the first, as it were, an index of the most important 
works of art, to the second a collection of most important 
information suggested by the practice of art. Every- 
thing depends upon not confounding hints with reality, 
and hypothetic warnings o r  imperatives with categoric 
imperatives : a confusion which multiple and continuous 
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temptations are certainly apt to induce, whence it is easy to 
be dominated by them, but not at all inevitable. Books of 
literary origin, rhetoric, grammar (with their divisions into 
parts of speech and their grammatical and syntactical laws),  
of the art  of musical composition, of metre, of painting, and 
so on, contain the principal hints and collections of precepts. 
Tendencies toward a definite expression of art  are manifested 
in them either only in a secondary manner,-and in this case 
it is ar t  that is still abstract, ar t  in elaboration (the poetic arts 
of classicism o r  romanticism, purist o r  popular grammars, 
etc.) ,-or as tendencies toward the philosophical comprehen- 
sion of their argument, and then they give rise to the divi- 
sions into kinds and into arts, an error which I have criti- 
cised: an error which, by its contradictions, opens the way to 
the true doctrine of the individuality of art. 
Certainly this doctrine produces at first sight a sort of 
bewilderment: individual, original, untranslatable, unclassi- 
fiable intuitions seem to escape the rule of thought, which 
would seem unable to dominate them without placing them 
in relation with one another; and this appears to be pre- 
cisely forbidden by the doctrine that has been developed, 
which has rather the air of being anarchic or  anarchoid than 
liberal and liberistic. 
A little piece of poetry is Esthetically equal to a poem; a 
tiny little picture o r  a sketch, to an altar picture o r  an 
afresco;  a letter is a work of art, no less than a romance; 
even a fine translation is as original as an original work1 
These propositions will be indubitable, because logically 
deduced from verified premises: they will be true, although 
(and this is without doubt a merit) paradoxical, o r  at va- 
riance with vulgar opinions: but will they not be in want of  
some complement? There  must be some mode of arrang- 
ing, subordinating, connecting, understanding, and domi- 
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nating the dance of the intuitions, if we do not wish to be- 
wilder our wits with them. 
And there is indeed such a mode, for  when we denied 
theoretic value to  abstract classifications we did not intend to 
deny it to  that genetic and concrete classification which is 
not, indeed, a “classification” and is called History.  In his- 
tory each work of art  takes the place that belongs to  it-that 
and no other: the ballade of Guido Cavalcanti and the son- 
net of Cecco Angioleri, which seem to be the sigh or the 
laughter of an instant; the “Cornmedia” of Dante, which 
seems to  resume in itself a millennium of the human spirit; 
the “Maccheronee” of Merlin Cocaio at the close of the Mid- 
dle Ages, with their noisy laughter; the elegant Cinquecento 
translation of the E n e i d  by Annibal Car0 ; the dry prose of 
Sarpi ; and the Jesuitic-polemical prose of Danielo Bartoli : 
without the necessity of judging that to be not original which 
is original, because it lives; that to be small which is neither 
great nor small, because it escapes measure: o r  we can say 
great and small, if we will, but metaphorically, with the in- 
tention of manifesting certain admirations and of noting 
certain relations of importance (quite other than arithmetic 
or geometrical). And in history, which is ever becoming 
richer and more definite, not in pyramids of empirical con- 
cepts, which become more and more empty the higher they 
rise and the more subtle they become, is to  be found the 
link of all works of ar t  and of all intuitions, because in 
history they appear organically connected among them- 
selves, as successive and necessary stages of the development 
of the spirit, each one a note of the eternal poem which har- 
monises all single poems in itself. 
